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essential as it was to meet a Turco-German threat to India while the issue of the War was as yet uncertain, placed the Tashkent Soviets in peril and might have lost them Turkistan. The British action was never intended to do more than achieve the limited object of preventing the use of Turkistan with its communications as a springboard for attack on India, but in carrying this out it inevitably made more difficult the execution of Soviet general policy in the same quarter. On a narrower stage also it probably delayed the assumption by the Soviets of effective control over the Khiva and Bukhara States.

It was not until September 1920 that the last Mangit Emir, Abdul Said Mir Alim, found himself unable to maintain his position in Bukhara and gave way to a national reformist group which, after the manner of the Young Turks of Istanbul, called itself a Young Bukhara Party. The chairman of the Party was a young Bukharan named Osman Khoja, who later distinguished himself with Enver's successor, Haji Sami, and helped to maintain relations between the Basmachis and their sympathizers in Afghanistan. The *coup d'état* was achieved with the aid of Soviet troops which plundered the ancient city, destroying many of the *medreses* and setting fire to the famous library containing at that time possibly the most valuable collection of Muslim manuscripts in the world. The Emir fled to the mountains in the eastern part of his State (now Tajikistan), where he established a base at Dushembe (now Stalinabad). He maintained himself there among the Basmachis until March 1921, when he withdrew to Afghanistan. The same period saw the end of an independent Khiva, where a Young Khiva Party seized the person of the Khan, handed him over to the Russians and began to rule themselves.

Although these parties of young revolutionaries were at the outset far to the Left in their political views and were under the closest Soviet control, Bukhara and Khiva were not at first required to call themselves Socialist Soviet republics. The Kremlin was content to know them as Peoples' Soviet republics and to leave them to be governed nominally by the 'young' parties who had seized power, with a Russian political repre-

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sentative in each capital. In the case of Bukhara there was a Russian resident at Kaghan (the new city on the main line eight miles from old Bukhara), working through a Russian commission of two which closely controlled the Bukharan ministers. The reality is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that the Bukhara government had no army and only a rudimentary police force. It suited Russia to proceed gradually in the absorption of two States which stood for a centuries-old tradition of Muslim independence under Uzbek rulers.

Behind this façade there was much activity. Among the local nationals there were really three Parties,[1] the Conservatives, the Innovators (who were not Socialists) and the Socialists. The Conservatives the younger Parties despised — they included the *ulema* and many of the adherents of the ex-Amir whom the new idea disliked — but in the event, as all accounts of the Basmachi struggle show, it was they who had most influence with the tribes and their strength was underrated. The most distinguished of the Innovators was Mustafa Chokai, who had headed the ill-starred Kokand government[2] and was chosen later as the man best suited to represent the new idea of Young Turkistan before the Peace Conference in Paris. Later he settled in France and we shall hear of him again. The Socialists were much farther to the Left but they were sincere Turkish patriots. Togan,[3] himself a man of the Left, showed breadth of mind in devoting time and thought to clandestine negotiations for the establishment of what would now be called a Popular Front with a common programme on which the two progressive groups, Socialist and non-Socialist, could unite. These Parties succeeded in the end in forming a coalition to which was given the name of National Union. Originally, on the wave of new-found 'democratic' enthusiasm which followed the Emir's fall, the Young Bukharans had felt themselves to be in tune with their Soviet Russian mentors. But with the arrival of Togan and his friends hot with news of the Baku Congress and Soviet perfidy in Bashkiria and elsewhere, their enthusiasm for things

1 [See cat. 116, pp. 103-104 — Analyst] Togan, op. cit. p. 407.

2 [See cat. 116, pp. 7-8 — Analyst]

3 [See cat. 116, pp. 104-12 — Analyst]

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668 Russian waned, and they planned an active deviation. It is a good early instance of a tendency which has since become well known, what the Soviets call the deviation of the bourgeois-nationalist. They soon turned their thoughts to setting up a common front with the Basmachi rebels in the mountains against their Russian masters.

As might have been expected, these young intellectuals did not understand the tribes, who for their part ridiculed and distrusted the new-fangled antics and professions of city politicians. There were many comings and goings, but little real comprehension was achieved between elements so diverse. Togan understood the point of view of both sides and has much to say of the details of the negotiations. He puts the following words [1] in the mouth of a courier sent to Jemal Pasha, but it is just this sort of thing that the tribes heard and disliked:

> Our aim is to find means to force the Russians to accept our proposals, to strengthen the National Union, inspire a modern, national, political spirit into the organizations that are prepared to fight, to get rid of the shameful and disturbing activities of the Emir's adherents, to clear out fanatics and replace them by people faithful and useful to the League, and to convert the whole revolt into a military organization of young and educated revolutionaries which can become a partisan movement.

000 It is easy to imagine the reaction of Muslim tribal leaders to a manifesto of this sort issued by youths who themselves often sickened at the mere sight of blood (there were instances of craven conduct by young revolutionaries). They would look the schoolmen askance from under beetling brows, resent their disloyalty to the Emir and mock their orations to scorn as silly romance. There was a revealing and barbaric example. A young delegate was trying to win over to the cause a fierce old chieftain of the Basmachis, Toghay Sari of the Lakai tribe of Uzbeks. Toghay, a formidable grey-beard of 75 years, heard the envoy out, then turned on him and wrenched out from beneath his coat a bunch of human ears. With a sardonic

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 430.

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XV

WORLD WAR II

How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?

ONE result of the accumulation of all these pressures was to impel such of the intellectuals of Turkistan as could escape and evade the frontier guards to seek sanctuary beyond the reach of the long arm of the Kremlin. After 1923 escape became difficult, and refugees were reduced to a mere trickle. But most of the refugees of the older emigration were men like Mustafa Chokai,[1] Osman Khoja or Togan, who had played a leading part during the interregnum and succeeded in crossing the frontiers before the Soviets had had time effectively to bar the gate. Many of them reached Afghanistan by crossing the Oxus in its higher reaches. Some went to pre-partition India, and settled down in a colony in Peshawar. Osman Khoja is still in Pakistan. Others drifted through the Arab world, and one group established itself in Cairo. Togan found his way ultimately to Turkey, the bourne of many thousands of Crimean and other refugees from Turkic lands farther to the west, some of them, such as Jafar Krimer of the Crimea, men of considerable renown. Mustafa Chokai went to Paris, where he lived as an exile from 1921 onwards and became well known in all circles interested in Central Asian affairs. One, Kayum Khan, a younger man of a well-known Uzbek family, has made a home in Germany. On him fell Chokai's mantle. Later events have shown him to be endowed with gifts of leadership, and not without that singleness of purpose which enabled Jinnah to found a State in Asia not many years ago.

[1] Sometimes known as Chokaiev or Tchokaieff in Russian or French fashion, or as Chokayoghlu in Turkish fashion. The various transliterations of Turkish names, taken through Russian and French, are tiresome.

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[see pp. 230-242—Analyst]

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668 Mustafa Chokai was among the most eminent of the older emigration. A good French scholar, he was able to give voice to the aspirations of his countrymen in words which could reach the ears of Western Europe and America, and in turn to interpret Europe to his own people. 'We have to be', he said, 'at one and the same time the architects and masons of a healthy national structure in which we would wish to see harmonised our national liberation and our love and admiration for European culture.' [1] He started an organization named *Millij Türkistan Birligi* (Unity of National Turkistan), and was indefatigable in preaching the possibility of a smaller unity within Turkistan itself, which should embrace the different races without distinction of Uzbek, Kazak, Turkmen or Kirghiz, and including the Tajiks on the ground that they are intermingled with the Uzbeks and often bilingual, speaking both their own dialect of Persian and Uzbek. These ideas, taken over by Kayum, were a good deal less ambitious than a plan formulated independently in Istanbul for the creation of a Greater Turkistan which should include with Turkistan proper the Turco-Tatar peoples of the Volga and the Bashkurds of the Urals. This plan has received the name of Türkili, possibly inspired by Togan's book. Its sponsors seek to justify it on the ground that neither Turkistan proper, which has an open frontier in the north and a settlement area crowded with Russians, nor the Volga–Ural region, surrounded as it is by Russians on all sides, could by themselves be regarded as viable units for a State. If then they are to aspire to independence, they must unite. As is usual among émigrés, there are also other splinter groups.

All groups are agreed that they are set on an autonomous Turkistan, and they do not seek political association with Turkey. But while Chokai's successors aim at independence, others have in view some sort of union or federation with a new United States of Russia. There has been a difference in emphasis on the point whether Eastern Turk patriots would do well to stand in with Russian émigré organizations in

[1] Speech to Royal Central Asian Society, 29th March 1933.

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seeking the overthrow of Bolshevism — a debate hotly contested. 668

There is support in America and elsewhere for this line of thought, so apparently consonant with democratic theory. The argument runs that all non-Slavs of the emigration, old and new, would do well to concentrate their hopes on the collapse of the Stalinist system, trusting that, when tyranny breaks, it will give way to a multi-national régime on a Western democratic model, to be set up in the whole of the Russian Empire. In this new house, it is suggested, all the 'minorities' would find it easy to meet and merge, just as the various stocks have been able to do in the United States.

The answer to this pleading is clear enough. In the first place, the term 'minority' is resented as a misconception, for each non-Slav people in its own land is the very people of that country, brought into subjection by conquest from without. Secondly, this attractive vision of a United States of Russia is seen by men who surely forget that immigrants entered America from the countries of Europe because they desired, often passionately, to lose their individual traditions and memories in the larger hospitality of the New World. In the Russian Empire, whether under Tsars or Soviets, the non-Slav peoples took no such initiative. They were twice conquered by Great Russians, whom they regard as their historical oppressors. Consequently, any Central Asian Turk of the emigration who may be persuaded to stand in with anti-Soviet Russians on a common platform against Stalinism tends to be spurned by the less equivocal group under Kayum Khan, which will have no dealings with any Russian who is not prepared to concede in advance the right of Turkistan to an existence as a free State bound in no way to any future Russia. This more rigorous view is founded on the belief that no Russian party with a programme confined to the overthrow of the existing régime can be trusted to give freedom to the national components of the present Russia. In such a succession State, they hold, the non-Slav peoples would only exchange one master for another, and in support of this view

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668 they refer to the attitude of the Russian Whites in the 1918–20 period. But, given agreement that, by whatever means, all are working towards eventual independence and not for an imaginary United States of Russia, there is something to be said at this stage for treating this controversy as more concerned with tactics than with the substance of policy.

Whatever the emphasis, these ideas may seem to be the vague dreams of an embittered emigration, to be dismissed as without substance, impossible of conversion into reality in a practical world. Even in their dreams, it will be said, these men, already old and out of touch with the actual in their own country, contend violently one with another and fail even to subordinate their personal ambition to the common good.
668 This might have been the verdict before 1941.[1] But with the
727 War hard facts broke in, in the shape of many thousands of
167 Central Asian, Caucasian and other 'minority' deserters and prisoners from the Soviet armies, who fell into German hands in the first months after the German attack on Russia. At one time there were well over one million of these people in German prison camps. Many died, but many lived on to serve as legionaries against Russia. They came from all the five republics of Central Asia, from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and the North Caucasus, from the Volga and the Urals and from the Crimea. During nearly four years of service, they gave proof of their own capacity as soldiers and of the real attitude of the younger generation to the Russia from which they had come. It was a young emigration in mass formation. It was their tragedy that, like the Kalmucks in the XVIIIth century, they were used as pawns in the struggle of two contending empires on the chess-board of power-politics. In such a contest their own aims, however noble, could not be realized.

From Turkistan alone later interrogations established that well over half a million men either deserted to the Germans or were taken prisoner in the first year following June 1941. These were first placed in prison camps in Poland under appalling conditions, and treated as brutally as the Nazi

[1] [For background, see cat. #6, pp. 243-246 --Analyst]

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régime treated all prisoners from Russia. Starvation diet was the rule, and there was no medical care. A raging typhus epidemic attacked the camps, and more than half the prisoners died of hunger, fever and general hardship. Towards the end of 1941 Mustafa Chokai and Kayum Khan, both of whom had been at first arrested by the Germans as former Soviet citizens, were released from Paris and Berlin respectively and met in Paris. They obtained the consent of the German Government to tour the prisoner-of-war camps, where they found their compatriots in the frightful conditions described and persuaded the German Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories under Rosenberg (the Ostministerium) to organize a Commission for the classification and possible enlistment of the prisoners as volunteer legionaries in the German forces. During their tour of the camps, Chokai contracted typhus and was removed to Berlin, where he died in December 1941. The task then fell to Kayum Khan, on whom Chokai's mantle fell as Commissioner for Turkistan. Other Commissioners were appointed by the Ostministerium to deal with men from Azerbaijan, the Volga-Ural, the Caucasus and the Crimea.

Kayum's organization was on a large scale, and succeeded by the end of the war in putting as many as 180,000 men from various parts of Turkistan into one or other formation of the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS. It is true that the larger part of these — rather over 100,000 — were placed in labour, guard, ordnance and supply formations, but there were also at least 40,000 combatant troops, who gave on the whole a good account of themselves. The larger part of the 162nd German Infantry Division was made up of men from Turkistan, and in addition there were nineteen independent battalions and twenty-four infantry companies of which the rank and file consisted wholly of Turks and Tajiks from the east of the Caspian. These were all volunteers in the Wehrmacht. There was also a Waffen-SS formation known as the *Osttürkisches Waffenverband* (East Turkish Armed Formation) made up of four regiments of two battalions each. Of these four regiments, one was composed of men from Turkistan; the

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other three being from Azerbaijan, Volga–Ural and the Crimea respectively. Like so many SS units, this force (not formed until 1944) was not a combatant unit, but was designed as a collective political entity largely for purposes of propaganda. To the very end of the war the German High Command halted between two political opinions as to their treatment of the 'minority' peoples from Russia who had fallen into their hands. As regards those of Turkish race, should they organize on pan-Turkic lines, or should they make a distinction by areas? In either case, should they declare themselves behind liberation movements and in favour of the establishment of independent States, or should they aim, on conquest, at taking these people over as a new German colonial empire? Himmler inclined towards pan-Turkism and at least a declaration of German support for independence; Rosenberg was for a realistic distinction of races, and supported the recognition of independence by several areas; Hitler, with his arrogant contempt for Asiatic peoples, cared for nothing but willing service without conditions and looked to a time when the German yoke would merely replace the Soviet. The Waffen-SS formation, with its grouping of all Russian Turks in one division but with separate regiments, was a compromise between these opinions. In the end Rosenberg was authorized to declare for the recognition of the independence of Turkistan, but not until March 1945, when it was much too late to influence the behaviour of the mercenaries or to affect the issue in any way.

In the beginning things went well. Those in the prison camps had it put to them, 'Either stay where you are, or come and fight against Communism'; and all but some 20,000 of them gladly obeyed the call and volunteered for service. There was a natural desire for freedom from captivity, and it was not until the volunteers realized that the Germans had made no precise declaration of their war aims that doubts began to arise. With the encouragement of the Ostministerium, a national committee (the National Turkistan Unity Committee) was formed under Kayum and charged with the political and

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national leadership of the volunteers. It was expected to act as the honest broker between the men and the German Army and Party authorities. From the beginning this committee worked for German recognition of the principle of national independence for Turkistan, and on this ground was continually at variance with the German authorities and even with the German commanders of the legions. But, as the War went on, Kayum seems to have been tacitly allowed to spread the gospel of independence among the volunteers themselves both in speech and writing. It was found that without such propaganda the morale of the troops could not be sustained, and the Ostministerium, itself sympathetic, gave the committee a free hand, provided that the propaganda was limited to the volunteers themselves. This did not prevent the SS at one stage from demanding that the whole organization of Eastern Turks should submit to work under Vlassov's leadership 'for the liberation of all the peoples of Russia from the Soviet yoke'. This the committee categorically refused. But to the end, that is up to March 1945, there remained a conflict of idea: the Germans enlisted these men for the struggle against Communism, the volunteers were only willing to fight for the restoration of their independence.

This uncertainty of political aim seriously affected the volunteers' morale. The most distinguished officer of commissioned rank among them, Ghulam Alim, a former sergeant in the Red Army who had deserted, felt himself so frustrated that he fled with 200 men into the Slovakian mountains, where he was shot by partisans. This man had won every possible German decoration for bravery, including the Iron Cross, and had been promoted to command of a regiment, but he was distracted by the conflicting political influences and could not stand the course. A further reason for discontent was a narrow and mistrustful German policy in the matter of appointment and promotion of Eastern Turk officers. Almost all the officer cadres were German, more than one unit having a German element up to 15 per cent of its strength. Among 180,000 volunteers there were only eighty-seven Turkish

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officers, out of whom thirteen held only nominal commissioned rank in the National Committee. The remaining seventy-four were distributed fifty-one to the Wehrmacht and twenty-three to the SS formations. The Germans had not even the sense to draw a distinction between deserters and prisoners-of-war, and German commanders angrily attributed discontent on this score to the factious interference of the committee. The men for their part could not but regard the presence of so many Germans, even down to NCO rank, as a sign of obvious mistrust. Language difficulties were great and prevented understanding; the words of command were given in German, and Germans with the units made little or no attempt to learn the Asian languages. An extreme folly was the allotment of a differential scale of rations to Germans and Turks, even to those employed on similar duties within the same unit. The armament handed out consisted mainly of captured Russian weapons notoriously inferior to the German — a policy which had a severe effect on morale since the superiority of German weapons in 1941 was known to have undermined the confidence of the Red Army. It was not surprising that some 3000 desertions took place, but of these only 800 were on the Eastern Front and most of those not to the Red Army but to anti-Soviet partisans.

The Germans did undertake one interesting experiment. In response to requests for religious instruction arrangements were made to attach an *imam* to every unit. Some of these were found from among the personnel in the units themselves, while others were trained in two schools which the German government opened in Dresden and in Göttingen. The Dresden school was intended mainly to train priests for the Waffen-SS formation and, as might be expected from its aims and from the association with it of that old fox El Hajj Amin Hussaini, ex-Mufti of Jerusalem (then in Germany), it tended to subordinate spiritual to political aims and to preach a refined form of pan-Turkic pan-Islamism. The Göttingen theological school was a more genuine attempt to provide for spiritual needs, and one less corrupted by purely political ends

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and catchwords. Some idea of the difference of approach between the two schools, and incidentally of the crudity of German ideas on subjects such as these, can be gathered from the reports. There was hot argument on the point whether it is necessary to draw distinctions between a training in Sunniism and one in Shiism. The Dresden school, influenced apparently by its orthodox Sunni advisers, seems to have flatly announced that Shiism does not really exist, while that at Göttingen was constrained to observe that the people of Turkistan are no doubt all Sunnis, but the majority of the Azeris, like the Persians, are Shiahs, and history demonstrates the lack of understanding between the two.

Religious services and teaching were in great demand in the units and the imams did much to strengthen morale. Experience showed that their ministrations were desired by all of every age-group, including the youngest men. The scheme had of course in it a strong element of exploitation of spiritual needs to serve a worldly end; its welcome suggests a condition of spiritual hunger among the volunteers such as only Soviet propaganda can induce.

In spite of all the German mistakes of principle and practice, in spite of the frequent crudity of method and the general inability of the German officer to give that emotional touch to his relations with men of another race which can alone command the devotion of Asian troops, it can be said that on the whole these Eastern Turkish and Caucasian mercenaries served their new masters not so unfaithfully to the end. Three battalions from Turkistan fought to the last man in front of Stalingrad, others were destroyed in fierce fighting in the Caucasus, six battalions held up the Russian advance for a time in front of Berlin. Altogether they suffered losses in killed of some 50,000 men, and 12,000 war disablements — figures against which the numbers of desertions sink into insignificance. They proved good soldiers with a child-like trust in their officers if these tried to understand them and treat them well. Where there is record of close personal relations being established between officers and men, these Turks were capable

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of extreme devotion, as when a battalion which had broken out of a pocket near Kharkov re-entered it in order to rescue the body of a German commander who had won the affection and respect of his men. Most of them showed astonishing powers of endurance and a flair for guerrilla fighting. It was noticed that, Communist or not in upbringing, the youth of Turkistan was always influenced by a national tradition inculcated in family life. This tradition, which often had a religious background and remained a living one within the family, had made the youth sceptical of Communist teaching and ready to welcome those who could speak to them of what they could better understand. There was evidence too that in the Red Army the Muslim peoples had had a raw deal; they disliked the Russian mentality and felt aggrieved. Those who were better educated had in mind the purges and the waves of arrests and banishments which followed any demonstration of national pride; the rank and file recalled bitterly the deprivation of lands and flocks which had gone with collectivization. Those Russian cruelties they would never forget; the bloody eyes[1] of Skobelev, Kuropatkin and the Commissars were for them the eye of a single ogre, who would not leave them in peace. It was fortunate for the Allied cause that the Germans proved so heavy-handed. The inevitable impression is that the Germans did not deserve to have such men to lead. They used them only to serve a German purpose; when totalitarian Germany fell, she dragged down her mercenaries with her. The path was uncharted and there was no clear direction for men who sought anxiously for a goal. In the end most of the volunteers who did not perish were by Allied agreement handed back to their old masters, and disappeared. Cast to and fro between two tyrannical forces, lacking a home and refused understanding, often tortured when not killed, for them the end was bitterness.

Some have remained in the West after all was over. These include Kayum Khan, the leading spirit and the firmest of the national committee, and some of his helpers, as well as a number

[1] An allusion to Skobelev's cognomen, *gök kanli* — bloody-eyes.

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of members of the national committees who dealt with volunteers from other minorities within Soviet Russia, in particular those from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. These continue to be the most prominent representatives of the new Muslim emigration from the USSR. They are in a strong position as against the older emigration, in that they have now an intimate sense of the hopes and fears, the elations and disappointments, of a great mass of their countrymen who had risked and often given their lives for what they thought their aim and duty — the liberation of their country from the Russian yoke. In their persons they have renewed the experience which inspired men like Togan and Chokai in the old days of the interregnum period of 1918 to 1924. Once more they have failed to realize their dreams; Hitler's Germany, though they had no chance to look elsewhere, was not the helper that they needed. Yet what happened shows at least that a strong spirit of independence had survived a quarter-century of Soviet rule and still lived in the hearts of thousands of the youth brought up in Communist schools.

It is not surprising that Soviet Russia after the war should bend so much energy to the suppression of all signs of nationalism among the kinsmen of these men in Turkistan.

There is one aspect of these events of some further significance. We know how the Soviets had divided the Eastern Turkish peoples into separate units on an ostensibly racial and linguistic basis — the policy of cantonization. The name of Turkistan disappeared from the Russian map in 1924. Later measures in the linguistic field, and the introduction of separate Roman and later Cyrillic scripts for each republic, intensified local idiosyncrasies and hampered mutual understandings. The ban on religion in education weakened such unifying effect as might have accrued from common religious thought. We have seen, too, how the Germans tended to the other extreme, and, while halting between two opinions, were inclined to flirt with ideas of pan-Turkism. The national

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The national

•668 committee under Kayum Khan's direction followed a middle course. They stood for a single united Turkistan, including the Persian-speaking Tajiks, roughly coincident with the limits of the five Soviet Central Asian republics, and they strove to inculcate the political idea of a common Turkistani nationality and allegiance. Unwilling to recognize that the several languages spoken in Turkistan are in fact languages and not mere dialects of one language, they tried to serve their end by inventing a middle-language — *ortatili* — which should become a lingua franca for all the country. They also did their best to encourage the German commanders to mix up the rank and file without regard to racial or linguistic affinities, making no distinction between an Uzbek or a Kazak, a Kirghiz or a Tajik. Their aim was a deliberate one, to counter the Russian policy of breaking down into small units and to re-create a common tradition for Turkistan. On the other hand they would have nothing to do with suggestions for a wider Turkish organism which should be shared with Azerbaijanis, Volga Tatars or Bashkurds. They stood for a smaller unity, confined to Turkistan alone.

ooo It is not easy to pronounce with confidence how far this policy is consonant with realities. On the one hand it was [327] noted that the Azeris, the only substantial people of Turkish stock in the Caucasus area, proved to be better combatant troops than any of the volunteers from Turkistan. This result may be partly attributable to the fact that, being alone, the Azeris were not mixed with other stocks and knew how they stood. The mingling of the five main stocks of Turkistan without any regard for origin or language must have produced a result not unlike what would follow if Pathans, Baluches, Panjabis and Awans were thrown together haphazard in the army of what is now Pakistan. It was a bold experiment and it can hardly have promoted efficiency, at least at the outset. On the other hand there is evidence that Uzbeks and Tajiks at any rate get on well together. (The Soviet attempt to play up the Persian character of the Tajik tradition is probably misconceived: Tajiks are often bilingual in any case.) As

LANGUAGE

With the exception of the Tajiks, virtually all the Muslims of Central Asia speak local dialects of one and the same Turki language group. Varying cultural influences to which the individual subgroups have been subjected in the course of history have led to a certain differentiation in the vocabulary and grammar of the principal dialects. Uzbek especially, having been exposed to strong Iranian and Arabic influences, has changed much, even to the extent of losing the vowel harmony common to the sound system of the Turki languages. By and large, however, it is possible to speak of the Central Asian Muslims as possessing linguistic unity: the dialectical differences, significant as they are to the philologist, neither prevent effective communication among the Turkic inhabitants nor preclude the eventual emergence of a single Turki literary language for Central Asia. The latter, however, had not yet been formed when the Communists conquered Central Asia in the 1920's and suppressed its further development.

The importance of language for national consciousness is self-evident: language represents the most ready means of national identification, available alike to the literate and illiterate. While not absolutely indispensable for nationality (witness the Jews), it is so intimately connected with it as to make it one of nationality's very best criteria.

Soviet linguistic policy in Central Asia has two principal aspects, both of which follow closely the general lines of Soviet nationality policy. In the first place it strives at all costs to prevent the formation of a single Turki literary language in Central Asia on the assumption that such a language would serve as a powerful weapon for the forging of a united Central Asian national movement. In the second place, it endeavors to promote the acceptance of Russian as the primary language of communication among persons of different groups. The first goal is fostered by exploiting all, even the minutest, dialectical differences among the various Turkic subgroups, and by granting the status of full-fledged national-literary languages to local variants of one and the same Turki language. The second is fostered through the official change of Turki alphabets from Arabic to Latin, and then from Latin to the Russian Cyrillic; through the gradual introduction of Russian words in their original form and spelling into the native vocabularies; through compulsory Russian language instruction in all schools above the elementary level; and, finally, through the requirement of a good knowledge of Russian for all citizens, regardless of nationality, desirous of making any kind of a career. It is apparently the hope of the authorities that, given sufficient time, such policies will make Russian the language of all the socially dynamic elements of the Muslim population and relegate Turkic to the status of a peasant dialect devoid of political importance.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RLl Turkestan RLl

5/7 GGB. The Russian Muslims already possessed such a class[1] prior to 1917, consisting largely of professional people, especially lawyers, teachers, journalists, and engineers from the Kazan and Baku areas. This intelligentsia played a leading role in the Muslim national movements during the Revolution and the period immediately following it; many of its members cooperated with the Soviet regime in the 1920's, during the era of Communist "softness" toward Muslim nationalism; others, especially those who had been connected with the White Guard movement during the Civil War, went into hiding or disassociated themselves from all further political activity.

5/7 GGI Most of the older Muslim intelligentsia of the Soviet Union — pro-Communist and anti-Communist alike — was physically destroyed in the course of the purges, arrests, deportations, and executions of the 1930's. On the eve of World War II Soviet Muslims found themselves without national leadership, since the only other classes capable of providing it — the landowners, merchants, and the clergy — had also been liquidated in the course of the simultaneous drives for collectivization and against the Islamic religion in the late 1920's and early 1930's.

It is a perennial dilemma of the Soviet system that its dynamic totalitarianism requires an unusually large body of trained officials, and yet it cannot permit these officials the freedom of thought and action which they demand in consequence of their training. The principal solution which Communism has so far been able to devise for this problem consists of periodic purges, causing the destruction of the established bureaucracy and its replacement with ever new personnel — a procedure very costly in terms of manpower, but roughly serving the purpose for which it is devised. However, the system of purges, mass as well as local, requires constant repetition, for purge as it may, the Soviet regime cannot alter the fact that the intelligentsia, whose growth it is actively promoting, chafes under the yoke of totalitarianism and constitutes one of the major sources of tension within the established order.

5/7 It is this feature of its system which compelled the Soviet regime to replace the old intelligentsia of Central Asian Muslims destroyed by it with a new one. The new intelligentsia is largely Soviet-educated, and comprises people most of whom are today under 40 years of age. This new intelligentsia is, by comparison with the old, pre-Revolutionary one, very numerous. According to Soviet statistics for 1939, in the 5 republics of Central Asia there were 66,000 active students in technical and other specialized schools above the high-school level, and 35,000 active students in universities and other institutions of higher learning. Central Asia also had 758,000 persons with a completed high-school education and 57,000 with a completed higher education. Even allowing that a sizable proportion of these persons consists of Russians and other Europeans, the number of Muslims among them must be very considerable. Measured by Western European

[1] [i.e., an intelligentsia -- Analyst]

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standards, the training of these "intellectuals," even graduates of universities, is quite poor. What matters, however, is not their level of knowledge, but their position vis-à-vis the rest of the population and the attitudes and aspirations resulting from their training.

Evidence indicates that the graduates of schools consider themselves superior to manual labor, and expect to be rewarded for their schooling with administrative or other office work. The Muslim intellectual seems to feel that education entitles one not so much to greater rewards as to a reduction of the working load. It is a professional intelligentsia which aspires to national leadership and is strongly interested in political action.

The Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia possesses many of the characteristics which distinguish the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole, but in addition it also displays certain traits engendered by special conditions prevailing in Central Asia.

The Muslim intelligentsia occupies in Central Asia a peculiar position: by origin, language, culture, and family ties, it is connected to the Muslim population; by training, work, and much of its world-outlook, it is identified with the Soviet regime. It thus belongs fully to neither of the two groups, constituting something of a third element which functions as a connecting link between the Russian-dominated regime and the native population. Such a class had existed, of course, in Central Asia prior to the Revolution, and it arises in most colonial systems, but it has never before been so numerous and ubiquitous as it is in Soviet Central Asia. What are its ideas, attitudes, and prospects? Upon the answer to this question depends to a large extent whether the potentialities of a Muslim revival in Central Asia can ever be realized.

Evidence secured from interviews indicates that Muslim intellectuals in Central Asia consider themselves full-fledged Europeans. Startling as this may be to a Westerner, it must be remembered that to many an Asian "Europe" means not so much a geographic concept as a way of life, characterized by technology and secularism, which had been brought to Asia by Europeans. None of the Central Asian refugees interviewed considered himself to be an Asian, and several took offence at the very suggestion that this may be the case. Most of the refugees have a vivid contempt for the non-Soviet East. For instance, several of the refugees who had served in the Soviet army in Iran during World War II spoke with utter contempt of the natives of that country as "Asiatics." Even Turkey, where several of the DP's found refuge after the war, appeared to them backward and "Oriental." Many Muslim DP's left Turkey for Germany or the United States after having been received there with open arms, because, as they put it, they found life there strange and difficult.

Despite its superficial Westernization and Sovietization, this new intelligentsia has not severed the ties binding it to the remainder of Muslim society in Central Asia. It is connected with the population culturally: the in-

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by the historical record. Several of the more educated refugees presented a completely distorted conception of Central Asian history; it was so idealized as to be a model for the stimulation of nationalist emotions.

The refugees also know very little about Central Asian history of recent times. The jadidist movement, the All-Russian Muslim movement, the events of the Revolution and civil war, the Kokand and Alash-Orda governments, are meaningless names to most of them. Most of the younger refugees knew of these events from the Soviet trials of the 1930's; none of them knew what these parties really stood for. *Basmachestvo* [14] was somewhat better known, because of its resurgence during the period of collectivization. Almost all of the refugees from Central Asia had had some personal experiences with the Basmachis, and could discuss the activities of these rebels in their region, though also tending to exaggerate their feats.

CONCLUSIONS

Speaking broadly, Soviet Central Asia may be said to have undergone in the course of the past fifty years two parallel developments: the native population has been transformed from a loose agglomeration of diverse tribes and ill-defined ethnic groups into several distinct nationalities, and the Russians residing in Central Asia have grown from an insignificant minority to an important segment of the total population. Both these developments are intimately connected; both may be expected to continue in the foreseeable future.

The first of these two processes has been by and large encouraged by the Soviet authorities because of their fear of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. Faced with the choice of a movement aspiring to integrate all the Central Asian natives into a single nationality bound by the ties of a common religion or racial descent, and the formation of several separate nationalities, they selected the latter alternative as less dangerous to their political hold on the area. This course, however, had its price, for it compelled the Communists to encourage the growth of national consciousness among the major native ethnic groups.

But it would be a mistake to seek in Soviet strategy the *cause* of this process of nationality formation. The cause lies far deeper. The growth of nationalism in Central Asia, as in other parts of the world recently affected by European ideas, institutions, and technology, must above all be ascribed to the fact that the encounter of Westernism and tradition rarely results in a clear-cut victory for either force, but rather leads to a synthesis of both. *Nationalism represents such a synthesis of imported Western and traditional native values.* It owes its success to the fact that it permits the adoption of all the essential features of European civilization

[14] *Basmachestvo* was a native resistance movement directed against the Soviet regime; it was particularly active in the period 1918–1922. See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 178–80, 255–60.

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177 without the surrender of the local ethos. It is strongest and most vital in
668 societies which, like the mid-20th-century Muslims of Central Asia, are in the very throes of this process of cultural fusion.

The Russian influx, uninterrupted since the beginning of the present
167 century, does not hinder this development except where it is accompanied by
177 large-scale physical destruction of the natives (as was the case with the Kazakhs). On the contrary, it rather strengthens it. In the Central Asian
668 context, the Russian population with its Russian culture must be regarded primarily as an agent of Westernization, and hence as a force accelerating the transition of the natives to full-fledged nationhood. The Russians not only tend to promote the spread of such ideas as secularism, utility, and anti-traditionalism, but also by their very presence and cultural cohesion, to induce the native to define his own national status. The Russian influx thus has not led to the emergence of a new, third nationality, "Soviet" in its culture, but to the split of the population of Central Asia into two parts: this split has tended to crystallize the national consciousness of both groups.

178 Without indulging in the dangerous and fruitless game of prediction
668 (which always presupposes some degree of historical pre-determination),
648 it is still possible, on the basis of the evidence adduced above, to arrive at some general political conclusions from the cultural tendencies discernible in Soviet Central Asia.

In the first place, Soviet Central Asia may be expected to grow in importance as an internal problem for the regimes, present and future, ruling Russia and its possessions. The Muslim natives, formed into full-fledged nationalities with settled populations, well-defined cultures, and indigenous intelligentsias, will be far more troublesome to their rulers than the disunited, half-nomadic, Islam-dominated Muslim tribes and ethnic groups of the past have been. In the second place, the entire area of Central Asia, including Chinese Turkestan with which Russian Central Asia has always been closely connected, may well tend to move with time in the direction of independent statehood. It is not inconceivable that this vast territory may same day be encompassed in a new Turkic, Muslim state, oriented toward the Middle East, and serving as a buffer among Russia, China, and India. In the past this has been prevented by Russian conquest and Russia's policy of supporting Chinese authority in Sinkiang out of fear of British and Japanese activity in this sensitive region. With Britain and Japan out of Central Asia, Russo-Chinese cooperation may be less intensive than before, and any possible disagreements among the great powers bordering on this area will only benefit the national aspirations of the local Muslims. Whether or not this will occur cannot, of course, be foreseen. But so long as the Central Asian Muslims continue to preserve their cultural peculiarities and, under Communist pressures, to evolve the characteristics of modern nationalities, as they have done in Soviet territories, so long will the cultural and ethnic bases for such a development be present.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
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[Baluchi]

two forms. More revealing is the fact that Stalin's speeches are printed in Baluchi by the State Publishing House of Ashkhabad, presumably for 'export purposes'. S.U. 563 670 Tu. 569

AN ARAB 'BIROBIDZHAN'?

The politically interesting minorities in Soviet Central Asia also include the Arabs, although the Soviet régime has been unable to exploit them as an instrument of its power politics.

The question to what end the 20,000 Arabs in Uzbekistan could best be used was carefully studied by Soviet Orientalists.[61] Eventually, they arrived at the conclusion that it was impossible to create an 'Arab Birobidzhan' in the Soviet Union, and, with considerable regret, gave up such a scheme and the great propaganda potentialities within it. They believed that nothing could be done for the cultural development of the Arabs in Uzbekistan, who are split into two groups, one inhabiting the Kashka Darya Province and the other living near Bokhara. The dialects of the two Arab groups differ so widely that understanding between them is possible only through the medium of the Uzbek language.

With few exceptions all Soviet Arabs speak either Uzbek or Tadzhik in addition to their own Arab dialect and it can be found frequently that people who describe themselves as 'Arabs' have no longer any notion of the language of their forefathers. The Soviet régime did not attempt to hold up this process of assimilation and Arab children are educated in either Uzbek or Tadzhik schools. Tu. [91]

The Arab dialects spoken in villages near Bokhara and Samarkand are as incomprehensible to the Arabs of Baghdad or Damascus as a foreign language. They have thus no export value, and the Soviet Government considered, therefore, that no useful purpose could be served by printing political literature in 'Central Asian Arabic'.

* * *

Two important conclusions are to be drawn from the situation in Soviet Central Asia. The first is that religious and political ideas opposed to Bolshevism have not yet been exterminated even if all organized anti-Soviet movements have been destroyed. Political ideas hostile to Bolshevism emerge time and again among the staffs of official Soviet institutions, universities, academies, publishing houses; they make themselves felt in the Union of Soviet Writers and even in the local branches of the Communist Party; they appear in novels, poems and scientific works. Tu. 668 ● S.U. 563 668

Islam is still unvanquished in Central Asia, not only as an idea but even as an organization, the only organization which covers the whole of Central Asia, with Tashkent as the natural centre. The 'Moslem Tu. 668 669 771

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Turkestan RL1

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Ecclesiastical Administration of Central Asia and Kazakhstan' is no Islamic fighting organization; on the contrary, it is forced to serve the Soviet régime. None the less, the fact that the régime saw itself compelled to tolerate the 'ecclesiastical administration' amounts to an official admission testifying to the tenacity of Mohammedan faith. Indeed, even faithful disciples of the Koran acquire Communist Party membership tickets, and sabotage the anti-religious policy from within, though only in small ways. The spiritual fight between Islam and Bolshevism goes on, particularly in the rural and mountain regions of Soviet Central Asia. The Soviet Government conducts the fight with the help of anti-religious films, lectures and museums; the believers by sticking to their religious customs, however much they may be deprecated by the authorities.

Tu 663

The second conclusion is that the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics can never become fully emancipated colonial territories because a few decades of Russian rule have succeeded in injecting them with a strong Russian ethnical element. The Russians dominate the towns of Central Asia and its industrial centres, they also constitute in many areas the most advanced section of the rural population. They are bound to keep important commanding posts in their hands not only because they serve as 'experts' in the absence of native cadres, but also because their numerical strength will always entitle them to be considered in the allocation of governmental jobs in industry and administration.

The emancipation of the peoples of India and Burma was considerably more far-reaching than that granted by the Soviet Government to the Central Asiatic peoples. When the British Government bestowed a new status on India, Burma and Ceylon, Britain did not 'bequeath' to the countries an English minority entitled to parliamentary seats and government posts and intended to assume an important or even a leading role in the economic life of the countries concerned. Unlike the British, who really left India, the Russians stayed in Central Asia.

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